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It has been pointed out by Yuen that the security theory of quantum key distribution(QKD)
guided by Shor-Preskill theory has serious defects, in particular their key rate theory is not correct.
Theory groups of QKD tried to improve several defects. Especially, Renner employed trace distance
and quantum leftover Hash Lemma. However, the present theory encountered a problem of a
quantitative evaluation of security. To cope with it, he uses a wrong interpretation on the trace
distance and its level εsec, and justifies the unconditional security of own system when εsec is
10−6 ∼ 10−20.
In this paper, we discuss the following problems. What is the origin of the misconception of the
present theory? How does the present theory lead to the misconception?. To show their process
toward the misconception, Koashi-Preskill’s theory which has a typical misconception is examined.
A main point of our comment is that QKD theory ignores “the security requirement against attacker”
which is necessary to compare whole encryption schemes from classical to quantum. To clarify it,
we emphasize that the trace distance itself cannot have any operational meaning such as failure
probability, and it is only mathematical tool as a measure of closeness. As a result, it is given
that the security with above values derived from their formulation means nothing in the general
cryptological sense. In addition, I point out that a comment by Bennett and Riedel on unconditional
security of QKD is not correct. Also, I point out that the experimental systems of groups of Los
Alamos, Toshiba-UK, NICT, and others cannot have security guarantee even in future.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Lc
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to stimulate the real dis-
cussion among researches who are interested in quantum
key distribution (QKD).
So far, taking the recent progress of theory of QKD
[1,2] into account, I have tried to explain “What is
the main point of misconception on the security theory
of QKD” in meetings of communities consisting of
Information theory, Cryptography, Mathematics, and
Physics [3]. Recently, Renner has responded [4] to my
paper, Yuen has responded to it and gave the detailed
explanation on Renner’s fault [5]. Here, however, it is
useful for the general researchers again to explain “What
is a main point of the argument ?”, because Renner still
believes that the system has sufficient security when the
level of the trace distance εsec as the security criterion
has a order of ∼ 10−20 [4]. His reasoning is that this is
very small as a probability in physical world. A main
subject in this paper is to explain that his εsec is not a
probability for event.
Our claim is as follows:
Claim
(a) The present theory does not deal with the security
evaluation for QKD correctly. At beginning, the correct
∗Electronic address: hirota@lab.tamagawa.ac.jp
concept in evaluation of secrecy for key distribution had
not been employed. That is, they did not care “what
are they evaluating?”. Just it was “information of Eve”
which is not an operationally meaningful concept in
cryptology. The information theoretic security in key
distribution has to be measured by success probability
of estimation by Eve according to Shannon [6] and by
her bit error rate (BER) [5] when she makes a wrong
estimate of the key.
(b) The present security theory is originated by
Shor-Preskill [7] suggesting post processing. Renner
introduced a trace distance [8] as the security criterion
to replace the mutual information criterion which is not
good quantum mechanically. To justify the formulation,
he was forced to employ the failure probability interpre-
tation of the trace distance( or its level). However, it
has been already pointed out that such an interpretation
does not work in view of probability theory. That
is, the trace distance (or its level) itself cannot have
interpretation as probability.
(c) Why does Renner insist such interpretations in the
security evaluation ? The reason is that the present
QKD protocol by post processing can bound the trace
distance or other criteria only by very large value in the
sense of security, depending on phase error estimation
and others in BB-84 protocol. So, in order to justify
the quantitative value in their theory, they insist on
the wrong interpretation of the trace distance such as
“failure probability”. By the correct theory of the trace
distance, the present theory can be re-evaluated. So the
present theory of QKD does not sufficiently ensure the
2security and uniformity (against Eve) of generated key
sequence by QKD.
(d) Following our observations on the present theory
on QKD, the protocol based on post processing cannot
provide sufficient “security and uniformity” which is
required in the common cryptology [3].
The research groups of information theory and cryp-
tography in Japan already understood our claim by my
explanations in several meetings, and they also under-
stood that they should take into account the serious de-
fect of the security concept in QKD. However, still the
research group of physics ignores the main claim.
To justify our claim, in the following, I will verify
concretely the misconceptions of the formalism for “the
security” of QKD groups in physics by using Koashi’s
theory as an example of the theory. To proceed it, I
analyze the following technical points.
(1) Theory groups of QKD in physics do not con-
sider the problem “What is a measure of security in
Shannon’s information theoretics cryptography ?”
(2) The origin of the misconception comes from the fact
that they do not deal with a concept of security require-
ment against attacker Eve, despite that “near uniformity
of generated key sequence against the attacker Eve” has
to be ensured. This is related with(1).
(3) The present theory deals only with privacy amplifi-
cation to claim the uniformity. But, the idea of privacy
amplification was introduced to create a scale change or
scale shift of mutual information between the key of Alice
and Eve’s measurement results in the original papers.
Although it seems that Shannon’s mutual information
can be reduced by such an operation, it does not mean
that the real information of Eve is deleted. Also they
ignore the fact that the privacy amplification does not
improve the success probability of estimation on whole
key(or uniformity of key sequence against Eve).
II. MAIN LOGIC OF SECURITY THEORY OF
QKD
A. Basic concept of the present theory
Here several important sentences claimed by the QKD
groups are listed as follows [9]:
(1) The task of the quantum key distribution theory
in the case of finite key is to prove that the key is secure
against any wiretapping of Eve, up to a small failure
probability.
(2) Eve’s knowledge can be bounded by the probability
that she correctly guesses Alice’s measurement outcomes.
This is expressed by the conditional smooth mini-entropy
of the data from which the key is generated given Eve’s
quantum system.
(3) The finite case is different from the case of asymp-
totic rate in which perfect security in the limit for n to
infinite is considered.
B. Structure of security theory of QKD
According to Tomamichel et al [9], the final structure
of the security theory to do the above sentences is as
follows:
In order to define the secrecy of a key, we consider
d = min
1
2
||ρSE − ωs ⊗ σE ||1 ≤ ∆ (1)
A key is called ∆-secret from E if it is ∆-close to the
ideal uniform key.
Definition[9]: A QKD protocol is called εsec-secret if
it is εsec-indistinguishable from a secret protocol where
(1− pabort)∆ ≤ εsec (2)
The main misconception is this definition. The con-
cept of the secrecy of the protocol is not appropriate to
evaluate the security of the real cryptological function,
according to the concept of Shannon’s information the-
oretic security. This is a kind of play in mathematical
school. However, in order to justify this logic, they pro-
vided the following structure.[10]
(1) The secrecy of BB-84 follows from the observation
that, Alice has a choice of encoding a n uniform bits in
either the X or Z basis, then only one of the following two
things can be true: either Bob is able to estimate Alice’s
bits accurately if she prepared in the Z basis or Eve is
able to guess Alice’s bits accurately if she prepared in the
X basis.
(2) Our analysis employs the Quantum Leftover Hash
Lemma, which gives a direct operational meaning to the
smooth mini entropy. It asserts that, using a random
Hash function, it is possible to extract a ∆-secret key of
length from X, where
∆ = min
1
2
√
2l−Hǫ
′ (X|E′) + ǫ′ (3)
ǫ′ is a smoothing parameter.
(3) Following theorem gives a sufficient condition for
which a protocol Φ is εsec-secret. The minimum value
εsec for which it is εsec-secret is called the secrecy of the
protocol.
Theorem(R− 1)[10]: The protocol Φ is εsec-secret
for some εsec > 0 if l satisfies
l ≤ max[n(q−h(Qtol+µ(ǫ))−2 log 1
2ǫ
−leackEC−log 2
ǫcor
]
(4)
where q,Q, µ, and others are given in [10].
3III. FUNDAMENTAL DEFECT OF QKD
A. Security
I point out repeatedly here that they have two
misconceptions as follows:
(a) The information theoretic security can be evalu-
ated by the concept of the secrecy of protocol.
(b) There is a reasoning for an interpretation of
failure probability of the trace distance in their formula-
tion which justifies the concept of the secrecy of protocol.
The main purpose of this section is to explain why the
above two claims are misconception ? To do so, I will
make clear first that theory groups of QKD misuse the
probability theory.
QKD groups assign an interpretation of binary decision
to all probability measures in their logical process. A
reason of why is that they start from the probability for
the abort of the protocol in the stage of threshold decision
based on quantum bit error and they are forced to reach
own definition of the security: “the secrecy of protocol”.
Thus, they stick to binary events in all logical process.
This is an origin of the misconception as explained below.
Unfortunately, Eq(1) means neither the binary deci-
sion nor the security of protocol. Just it means the close-
ness. However, they had started the formulation, keep-
ing the above binary concept. After formulation, they
realized that they have to include all concepts such as
“uniformity”,“Eve’s guessing probability”, and “indistin-
guishability” which are not binary event. To proceed it,
first, they employ the smooth min entropy which charac-
terizes the average probability that Eve guess X correctly.
Then this is used to give so called Quantum Leftover
Hash Lemma which discuss a relation between privacy
amplification and obtainable key length. Such a theory
may be forcible in connecting Eve’s strategy and privacy
amplification. Finally, they employ the failure proba-
bility interpretation of the trace distance. Thus, they
claim that the theory is including all concepts: “unifor-
mity”,“Eve’s guessing probability”, and “indistinguisha-
bility”, even though the definition of the security is bi-
nary events such as failure or success.
Then numerical examples are given based on this
formulation, and it is confirmed that one can assume
the value of εsec = 10
−6 ∼ 10−20 for key length n ∼ 104,
because they showed that one can realize such values
conceptually by ECC and PAC. That is, the main pro-
tocol based on ECC and PAC can only treat such values
in the real scheme. But, they cannot handle more small
value in their formulation, because of the limitation in
channel estimation process. These values are reasonable
when εsec means indeed the failure probability. Thus
they are forced to keep such an interpretation.
Unfortunately, these theories do not deal with the
concept of the information theoretic security (ITS)
correctly, which was pioneered by Shannon. Here I give
the answer to the first misconception, introducing the
correct concept of the ITS by Shannon.
Definition: The security of QKD has to be evaluated
by a success probability:Psuc(KG) of estimation for
whole key:KG. It is given by quantum M = 2
n-ary
detection theory for n qubits sequence. This probability
is also a measure of uniformity of key sequence.
Theorem(Y − 1)[5]F Let |KG| be the length of key.
The success probability of estimation for the whole key
can be bounded as follows:
Psuc(KG) ≤ 2−|KG| + d (5)
d = min
1
2
||ρSE − ωs ⊗ σE ||1 (6)
where d is the trace distance.
Thus, one can re-evaluate the QKD system (designed
by the present theory) based on the above relation be-
tween the trace distance and the correct measure of ITS.
Here one can consider two cases such as
A : d ∼ 2(−|KG|), (7)
B : d≫ 2(−|KG|) (8)
If the system has the case A, it can be regarded as
sufficiently secure. But in real situation, we have the
case B. Then we have
Theorem(Y − 2)[5]FLet εsec be the average level of
d in the Renner’s theory.
d = min
1
2
||ρSE − ωs ⊗ σE ||1 ≤ εsec (9)
Then one has
Psuc(KG) ≤ εF (10)
where εF = ε
(1/3)
sec from Markov inequality.
Thus, in the case εsec = 10
−20 for |KG| = 104,
Psuc(KG) ≤ 10−20/3 ∼ 10−7 (11)
If one wants to apply it to one time pad to guarantee
BER = 12 for any segment of the key, the uniformity is
required as follows:
Psuc(KG) = 2
−10000 ∼ 10−3000 (12)
Even if one can provide ε = 10−20 as individual value
in Renner’s theory, one has Psuc(KG) ∼ 10−3000 vs
Psuc(KG) ∼ 10−20.
Of course, one can relax the uniformity in practice, but
the difference is so large. Thus one cannot say it is se-
cure. On the second misconception, I will explain in the
next section IV, showing the concrete example.
4B. Key rate
The rate theory is formulated as follows: They
believe that the level of the trace distance assumed
as εsec = 10
−6 ∼ 10−10 is good enough already. So
they say that the problem is how many key bits can
be extracted under this level of the security. The
solution is Eq(4) in their formalism, and the privacy
amplification plays the main role. Thus one can see that
the result of key rate in their discussions is effective
under the value of d(trace distance). However, the
uniformity of key against Eve is given by her M -ary
quantum detection procedure before the privacy am-
plification. The Psuc(KG) cannot be improved by any
privacy amplification. So the uniformity against Eve
is fixed before the privacy amplification. Thus, the
relation between the key rate and privacy amplification
has to be reconsidered. Here one has the following result.
Theorem(Y − 3)[5]FLet εsec be the level of d in the
Renner’s theory and n be the key length. Then one has
Psuc(KG) ≤ εF (13)
The key rate R under the uniformity guarantee is given
by
R ∼ λ (14)
where
Psuc(KG) ∼ εF ≡ 2−λn (15)
This is completely different from the key rate theory
based on the present theory. Thus, Eq(4) is not able
to provide the sufficient condition for extracted key by
the theorem(R-1).
C. Asymptotic vs non-asymptotic key rate
The present theory has a strange problem such as the
title of this section. This is because the key rate is dis-
cussed by the ECC and PAC. However, as one can see in
the above section, the uniformity is given without ECC
and PAC, so the problem such as the title of this section
has no meaning. If εsec = 10
−20 for the key length 104,
the key length under the uniformity is about 30 bits and
the rate becomes zero when bits for the leak from ECC
and for the authentication are subtracted.
In sum, we emphasize that the present theory is not
treating the true key rate of QKD.
IV. CONCRETE EXAMPLE OF PROCESS OF
MISCONCEPTION
Koashi-Preskill theory
Here we describe the structure of Kaoshi-Preskill theory
on QKD [11]. First Koashi explains the concept of se-
curity criterion as follows: “The target of the security
theory of QKD is to analyze an information such as a
function of parameters estimated from quantum chan-
nel” to design privacy amplification.”
In order to proceed such an idea, he provides the
following mathematical basis.
(1) Let ρ1, ρ2 be two density operators. In the decision
of two density operators, the maximum success probabil-
ity is given by
1
2
+
1
4
||ρ1 − ρ2|| (16)
From this, one can understand that the trace distance
has an operational meaning such as “how much the
maximum value of the success probability can exceed 12”.
(2) There is a following relation between fidelity and
trace distance.
1− F (ρ− σ)1/2 ≤ 1
2
||ρ− σ|| ≤ (1− F (ρ− σ))1/2 (17)
(3) Let us assume that there is a little different state
from the maximum entanglement state, and assume that
the fidelity is given by
F (ρAB, ρmax) ≥ 1− ǫ (18)
The fidelity between state measured by Alice-Bob and
ideal state τABE is given by
F (σABE , τABE) ≥ 1− ǫ (19)
Koashi says that the fidelity has a strong meaning as
follows:
Let us use the generated key with the relation of Eq(19)
in any system. But, the probability “that different situ-
ation from the situation that the ideal key is used out-
breaks” is ǫ.
Based on such a concept, he proceeds the formulation
of the security analysis. That is, Keys of n bits are de-
scribed by M = 2n dimensional Hilbert space. The den-
sity operator for the whole system is given by
σABE =
∑
i
∑
j
pi,j |i, j >< i, j|AB ⊗ ρ(i,j)E (20)
Here two protocols : X-protocol and Z-protocol are
defined as follows:
(1) Z-protocol: Alice and Bob determine values of keys
by classical communication. The failure probability of
the protocol is evaluated by
ηZ = 1− 1
M
∑
i
∑
i
pi,i (21)
(This is average error probability among M events, and
it does not mean the binary event.)
5(2) X-protocol: The state of Alice is purified by classi-
cal communication. The ideal state is |0¯ >, and the final
state of Alice is σA. Then the the failure probability is
given by
ηX = 1− < 0¯|σA|0¯ > (22)
Here he employs the trace distance as the measure of
difference between the real one and the ideal as follows:
ηkey = ||ρABE − τ (key)ABE || (23)
By using these concepts, he shows the following theorem.
Theorem(K− 1)[10]: Let ηX and ηZ be the failure
probabilities of both protocols. The key in the Z-protocol
satisfies
ηkey ≤ 2ηZ + 2√ηX (24)
Thus, he showed a relation between the trace distance
and some {η} and interpreted it as the failure probability
of the protocol. In fact, Tamaki who is a group member
of Koashi claims in his paper that the protocol will fail
just one time at the million trials when the level of the
trace distance is 10−6 in that scheme.
Again, one cannot see the reason that each probability
measure in the process of the security proof means binary
such as failure or success.
Lets us mention the problem of the key rate. In
this stage, one needs the error correction code and
privacy amplification. Here values for ηZ and ηX are
assumed, and the security measure is fixed by Eq(24).
The problem is how many bits can be extracted from
the shifted key under the Eq(24). Koashi says that the
privacy amplification reduces the correlation between
key sequence and Ev’s measurement results. However,
this correlation provides only an apparent uniformity of
key against Eve, because the value of the trace distance
is fixed already. That is, the basis of the uniformity and
the rate is fixed from Theorem (Y-3) when the value of
the trace distance is fixed. But, he claims that
Theorem(K− 2)[10]: When the key sequence after
privacy amplification is employed as the final key, it sat-
isfies Eq(24), and the secure final key length is
l = n−KZ −KX (25)
Thus the logic is the same as that of Renner, and he
does not give any reasoning of the binary event. Thus
it shows clearly the process of the misconception from
M -ary detection towards binary interpretation.
V. WHAT DOES THE PRESENT QKD THEORY
TREAT ?
I have clarified the misconception of the present
theory of QKD in the above sections. Here I give the
general survey of this paper for researchers who are not
specialist on QKD.
(1) Criterion
The theory groups on QKD deal with several criteria such
as mutual information or trace distance to evaluate the
security of own system. However, these criteria them-
selves do not have any operational meaning of informa-
tion theoretic security. So before own formulation of the
security analysis, they should consider “what is a security
in cryptological sense ?” But they formulated the upper
bound for such criteria without such a main discussion.
Then, they justified the theory based on binary decision
such as abort or accept, despite that there does not exist
such a measure in their formulation. One can see it from
the logic of Koashi in the previous section.
According to the original concept on information
theoretic security by Shannon [6], it is clear that a main
measure to evaluate a security is the uniformity of key
against Eve which can be given by a success probability
of estimation to the key. This has clearly an operational
meaning. Consequently,
“They ignored the Shannon′s security concept”.
As I emphasized in this paper, the relation between
such a true criterion and trace distance has been given
(see Eq(5)). Thus, one can re-evaluate the quantitative
performance of security in the present theory, because
they discuss the level of the trace distance. As a result,
one can see that the security by the present theory is
meaningless from Eqs(11),(12).
In addition, the final key rate RF after subtractions
of the leak from ECC and message authentication is as
follows:
RF ∼ 0 (26)
(2) iid assumption and active attack
In the present theory and its application, so many re-
searchers keep in mind a serious assumption so called
“iid” in own model, where “iid” means independent and
identically distributed. Especially, they believe the effec-
tiveness of privacy amplification under such an assump-
tion. However, in the QKD model with imperfection,
one has to allows Eve to employ an attack so called ac-
tive attack such as bit change or correlation creation. So
one cannot expect “iid” in shared key sequence. Some
researchers take it into account, but still their concern is
limited to effect for privacy amplification only [12]. One
should go back to the discussion of the trace distance un-
der the active attack, and start under the understanding
of the fact that the trace distance describes a degree of
uniformity of the real qubit sequence, not failure proba-
bility.
6VI. COMMENT ON EXPERIMENTS
I here point out that the experimental groups of
R.Hughes [13], Z.Yuan and A.J.Shields [14], M.Sasaki,
A.Zeilinger and others do not provide the quantitative
security evaluation for own systems, and also do not com-
pare own system with the present theory of the security.
That is, the experiments are independent of the theory,
and the progress of the theory is ignored. Especially
A.J.Shields claims [15] that “High bit rate QKD with
100dB security”. Why 1 Mbit/sec is high bit rate nowa-
days. Also dB means the relative, but the security re-
quires absolute value. The technical requirement in the
real world is at least 1 Gbit/sec ∼ 10 Gbit/sec if they
want to apply the QKD to one time pad encryption. Even
if the present scheme of QKD are implemented, these in-
secure and insufficient systems can be easily replaced by
other technology.
On the other hand, recently Bennett and Riedel gave
a comment in March 2013 [16] such that “QKD boasts
unconditional security even in the presence of realistic
noise”, referring Mayers [17] et al, and “that the tech-
niques have matured enough that small commercial im-
plementations have been explored.” As I have clarified
in this paper, there is no proof even for own definition
of unconditional security. Thus, these comments are not
justified. I hope that we have an occasion for discussion
on this issue each other.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
I have described the origin of the misconception in the
security theory of quantum key distribution. Especially,
I pointed out that there are many misconceptions in rea-
sonings in the process of the security proof and that the
security designed by the present theory may be weaker
than that of the classical cipher, when the system is eval-
uated correctly.
In order to develop the quantum key distribution and
related subjects, one should consider more carefully the-
oretical formulation based on quantum detection theory,
following “the original meaning of information theoretic
security of Shannon”. I hope that the fruitful discussion
begins by this article.
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Appendix
A. Discussions in QIT meeting
[Q-1]: I do not agree with your talk. There are only
two results for security concept in QKD. That is, it
is success or failure of protocol. It is enough. (QKD
theorist)
7[A-1]: You should prove it mathematically, because
I am showing that the trace distance cannot have the
meaning of the probability.
[Q-2]: Although my field is not QKD, I agree with
your comment for the mathematical issue on the trace
distance. In general, the trace distance is just value
as closeness, it is not probability indeed. (Theoretical
physicist-1)
[Q-3]: I think that “the concept of the security” is
vague in any field. How to define the concept of security
in physics. (Experimental physicist)
[A-2]: QKD is cryptology and not physics. So the re-
searcher of QKD have to formulate the security of system
as the cryptology, and compare it with whole schemes
in cryptology. In fact, the definition of unconditional se-
curity by QKD community has no meaning in cryptology.
[Q-4]: What is the difference between unconditional
security and information theoretic security.(Theoretical
physicist-2)
[A-3]: The term of “unconditional security” was
invented by QKD community such that “when mutual
information of A-E channel or trace distance is bounded
(sufficiently small) by certain physical parameter, the
system is called unconditionally secure.” The commu-
nity thought that this is equivalent to the information
theoretic security, because it seems to be independent
of the computational power. But this is valid only in
the community of QKD. That is, it has no operational
meaning as the security in the cryptology.
[Q-5]: Do you mean that the mutual information (MI)
and also trace distance are not appropriate criteria.
(Theoretical physicist-2)
[A-4]: The meaning of the information theoretic se-
curity cannot be changed in mathematical scheme and
physical scheme.
The success probability of estimation for whole
shared key by QKD is a natural measure of information
theoretic security from Shannon’s concept. MI and
also trace distance can be used as mathematical tool to
bound the correct criteria, but these cannot have the
operational meaning. The present theory of QKD is
trying to directly give the operational meaning to them.
That is, they insist that the trace distance is the failure
probability.
[Q-6]: What is the success probability of estimation ?
(Theoretical physicist-3)
[A-5]: In “one time pad” without key distribution, the
channel model between plaintext sequence X and cipher-
text sequence C is described by conditional probability
(success probability of estimation). If the channel matrix
elements of X-C channel are completely uniform for all
kinds of ciphertext sequences, it means the perfect se-
crecy. That is, P (X |C) = P (X), ∀C. If the X-C channel
has partial uniformity, it has partial information theo-
retic security. So it provides the quantitative evaluation.
Here, a main origin of the security comes from the uni-
formity of pre-shared key sequence.
In the case of QKD, the measurements on key se-
quence of Eve YE on KG suffer the error by quantum
effects. This is also described by the channel model
based on success probability of estimation P (KG|YE).
The origin of the security comes from quantum effects
of KG-YE channel. Thus, by following Shannon theory,
QKD community should employ the criterion such as
P (KG|YE) based on the detection to each sequence in
whole possibility :2n =M at beginning.
[Q-7]: You mean when the present QKD is re-
evaluated by the correct criterion, it was extremely bad
or weaker than the classical one, even if QKD groups
claim the unconditional security (by own definition) or
unbreakable.(Theoretical physicist-3)
[A-6]: Yes, it is true. They want to enjoy the terms
of intrusion detection by uncertainty principle, quantum
loophole, and so on, but these are parameters only to
quantify the security criterion. They do not care the
real evaluation in cryptology.
[Q-8]: It seems that QKD groups do not follow
Shannon’s basic concept, and that they want to lock
the security issue only in physics. Can you analyze why
the community of QKD had taken the present way ?
(Information theorist-1)
[A-7]: I am not sure. They thought that QKD is
physics. As you know, QKD is a function in the cryptol-
ogy. That is, it provides only key distribution for sym-
metric key cipher, though the origin of the basic security
comes from just physical(quantum) phenomena. As a re-
sult, they ignored the regular course of the cryptology,
as you say.
